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I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of negotiable instruments law chronicles a strong 
infatuation with form. 1 While the formal requirements for negotiabil-
• Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. 
•• Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, 
Louisiana. The authors wish to thank Professor Patricia! Fry for reviewing an 
earlier draft of this Article. 
1. Professor Gilmore, in summing up the popular perception of negotiability, 
states: "Few generalizations have been more often repeated, or by generations of 
lawyers more devoutly believed, than this: negotiability is a matter rather of form 
than substance." Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 
63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1068 (1954). Gilmore, however, perceives things differently: 
Few generalizations, legal or otherwise, have ever been less true; the 
truth is, in this as in every other field of commercial law, substance has 
always prevailed over form. "The law," has always been in a constant 
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ity are not dictated by any one overriding explanatory principle,2 
they seem to have gathered strength historically in a society plagued 
by a shortage of currency and increasingly oriented towards the mar-
ket transactions that made currency important.3 For an instrument 
to function as a money substitute it was believed that its value must 
be clearly reflected on its face. This meant, at a minimum, that the 
amount payable and the time of payment had to be specified with 
certainty, and the obligation to pay, unconditional.4 Negotiable in-
struments law and a world-wide market economy came of age togeth-
er. 
Today, the formal requirements for negotiable instruments are 
found in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.5 With only mi-
state of flux as it struggles to adjust itself to changing methods of busi-
ness practice; what purport to be formal rules of abstract logic are merely 
ad hoc responses to particular situations. 
Id. at 1069. 
2. See Fred Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, 
and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REv. 531 (1951). 
3. This explanation of the forces behind the birth of negotiability has long 
been recagnized. Gilmore summarized it this way: 
The radically new problems all stemmed from the industrial revolution 
and the vastly increased number of commercial transactions which it 
spawned. When goods were shipped they had to be paid for. The idea that 
payments could be made in metallic currency, chronically in short supply, 
was ludicrous. The primitive banking system could not cope with the situ-
ation: The bank check which-a hundred years later-became the univer-
sal payment device was unknown. In effect the merchants and bankers 
invented their own currency. The form which they used was an old one: 
the so-called bill of exchange which was an order issued by one person 
(the drawer) to a second person (the drawee) directing the drawee to pay 
a specified sum of money at a specified time to a third person (the hold-
er). . . . These bills moved in a world-wide market, typically ending up in 
the possession of people who knew nothing about the transaction which 
had given rise to the bill, had no way of finding out anything about the 
transaction and, in any case, had not the slightest interest in it. 
Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON 
L. REv. 441, 447-448 (1979). See also FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE 
LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NOTES 2-3 (2d ed. 1992) ("In the years 
during which the form requirements were being fashioned, the law wished to pro-
mote the free transfer of negotiable instruments because negotiable instruments 
that passed from hand to hand in payment of debts were used to supplement the 
otherwise inadequate money supply"). 
4. Thua, derives the now familiar maxim that an instrument to be negotia-
ble must be "a courier without luggage." Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846). 
5. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations to "the Code" or 
"U.C.C." in this article are to the official text and comments of the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (1990). 
Bear in mind that although we limit our discussion to Article 3, the law of 
1995] MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 749 
nor variations these are the same basic requirements that were de-
veloped at common law and were later embraced by the Negotiable 
Instruments Law of 1896.6 To put this point another way, "time 
seems to have been suspended, nothing has changed, the late twenti-
eth century law of negotiable instruments is still a law for clipper 
ships and their exotic cargo from the Indies."7 To be negotiable under 
Article 3, the instrument must: be written;8 be signed by the maker 
or drawer;9 contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation, or power 
given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by Article 3;10 be 
payable on demand or at a definite time;11 and be payable to order 
or to bearer."12 
What was evidently overlooked by the drafters in their "anti-
quarian zeal"13 was the spectacular growth in the use of electronic 
communication technologies. We have evolved from a· paper-based 
world in which clipper ships roamed the seas to one in which infor-
mation is organized and structured into electronic messages.14 The 
question arises as to whether the traditional formalities of negotiable 
instruments law can be harmonized with the inexorable march of 
commercial practice towards electronic commerce. In the course of 
assessing the ability of existing paper-based legal requirements to 
accommodate technological change, a number of difficult issues arise. 
By far the most intractable issues are whether the electronic message 
can be brought within the definition of a "writing"15 and whether it 
negotiability is not so limited. For example, section 3-102 states: "This Article 
applies to negotiable instruments. It does not apply to money, to payment orders 
governed by Article 4A, or to securities governed by Article 8.n u.c.c. § 3-102. 
6. Unfortunately, much about the history of the Negotiable Instruments 
Law of 1896 (N.l.L.) remains shrouded in mystery. See Gilmore, supra note 3, at 
457 ("I do not know whether the banks drafted the N.l.L. The truth is that no 
one knows anything about the drafting of the N.l.L.: it was carried out almost in 
secret.n). 
7. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 448. 
8. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(6), (9); 3-104{a). 
9. Id. §§ 3-103(aX6), (9); 3-304(a). 
10. Id. § 3-104(a). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 461 n.44. Gilmore refers to Article 3 as "a mu-
seum of antiquities-a treasure house crammed full of ancient artifacts whose use 
and function have long since been forgotten.n Id. at 461. 
14. See generally Amelia H. Boss, The International Commercial Use of 
Electronic Data Interchange and Electronic Communications Technologies, 46 Bus. 
LAW. 1787 (1991). 
15. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (" 'Written' or 'writing,' includes printing, typewriting 
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can satisfy the definition of a "signature."16 A number of commenta-
tors have addressed these vexing issues, but there seems to be little 
consensus on the proper disposition. 17 For their part, courts continue 
to reach ad hoc determinations rather than principled resolutions. 18 
It is not inopportune therefore to take stock of Article 3's formal-
ities and the premises upon which they rest. In order to do more than 
restate the arguments for or against each prerequisite for negotiabili-
ty, it seems necessary, even at this late date, to take a second look at 
the first principle of negotiability. This principle is most often re-
ferred to as the "merger" principle.19 This is the idea that an ab-
stract and intangible form of wealth has been transformed into a 
tangible piece of paper with an obvious physical presence. The upshot 
of such a transformation is that the rights embodied in the paper can 
only be transferred by a transfer of the paper itself. 
The approach adopted here is both historical and analytical. 
Part II of this Article describes the historical development of assign-
ment law, and demonstrates that it parallels a more general shift of 
the law away from physical conceptions of property. It concludes that 
although a paper-based document may still be a practical require-
ment, there is no longer a valid theoretical justification for not mak-
ing the law of negotiable instruments media neutral. 
In Part III we survey the features of negotiable instrument law 
and compare it generally with the _law of assignments. This compari-
son suggests that the most striking substantive difference between 
the two systems is the doctrine of good faith purchase. In simple 
terms, this is the idea that a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable 
or any other intentional reduction to tangible form."). 
16. Id. § 1-201(39) (" 'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a 
party with present intention to authenticate a writing."). 
17. For a collection of views with respect to "writing" and "signature" issues 
relating to the Statute of Frauds of section 2-201, see Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, 
The Application of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds 
to Electronic Commerce, 13 J.L. & COM. 143 (1993). With respect to "writing" and 
"signature" issues relating to letters of credit, see Task Force on the Study of 
U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5, 45 Bus. LAW. 1521 (1990). 
18. For example, compare Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 
1989), aff d sub nom; Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1993 WL 
304567 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that a "record" under the Federal Records Act 
includes electronic data stored on Magnetic tapes) with Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Sylvan 
State Bank, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 961 (Kan. 1994) (holding that an 
electronic fund transfer is not a writing). 
19. See Gilmore, supra note 3, at 449. Other commentators have given it 
other names. For example, Robert Clark has referred to it as the "paperization" 
principle. See Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights uersus Paper Rights under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445 (1975). 
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instrument takes it free from all outstanding claims, including con-
tract defenses. 
Finally, in Part IV we explore the extent to which the conse-
quences of the good faith purchase doctrine can be replicated outside 
of the negotiability system. We conclude that even in a paper-based 
legal environment, this key feature of negotiability is readily attain-
able by parties employing electronic technologies. 
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ASSIGNMENT LAW 
Throughout most of the history of the common law, the contrac-
tual right to payment of a sum of money was not assignable to a 
party who was not a party to the original contract.20 In contrast, 
today contract rights generally are freely assignable. Indeed, the law 
has gone so far as to restrict the scope of permissible contractual 
prohibitions on the right to assign.21 
Three traditional explanations for the rule against assignability 
have been suggested. First, it has been widely suggested that the 
restriction on assignment was based on an embedded judicial fear of 
potential abuse which could occur if legal rights were assigned to 
persons in a more powerful or influential position and who could use 
that position unlawfully to enforce the newly acquired right: a fear of 
maintenance. 22 Whether the fear of maintenance was actually the 
reason for the rule against assignability is questionable: "[T]his could 
not be so, since it is clear that the rule prohibiting assignments ante-
dates the law relating to maintenance."23 Yet it appears clear that 
the fear of maintenance slowed down the development of the law 
regarding the assignment of contracts.24 This, combined with the 
technicalities of the common law procedures, the expense of legal 
20. The prohibition of assignment of contract rights was not peculiar to the 
common law: "Ancient German law, like ancient Roman law, sees great difficulty 
in the way of an assignment of debt or other benefit of a contract. The assignee 
who sued the debtor would be met by the plea 'I never bound myself to pay mon-
ey to you.' " 2 POLWCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 226 
(2d ed. 1978). The reasons for the prohibition are shrouded in history. See 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 780 (2d ed. 1990); MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 788 (3d ed. 
1990). 
21. See U.C.C. § 9-318(4) ("A term in any contract between an account debt-
or and as assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment."). 
22. W.S. Holdsworth, The Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common 
Law, 33 HARV. L. REY. 997, 1006 (1920); Winfield, History of Maintenance and 
Champerty, 35 LAW Q. REv. 50 (1919). 
23. MURRAY, supra note 20, at 789. 
24. See HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 534 (1925); J.B. Ames, Dis-
seisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REY. 337 (1890). 
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proceedings, and the ease with which jurors and other law enforce-
ment personnel could be corrupted or intimidated, directed courts to 
repeatedly prohibit all practices which favored maintenance.25 
It has also been suggested that early common law lawyers had 
difficulty thinking in abstractions, and therefore could notconceive of 
the transfer of an intangible contract right.26 However, "the incapac-
ity of early lawyers to corporialize the incorporeal has been greatly 
over-stressed by modern writers. Medieval lawyers were perfectly 
capable of visualizing ownership of disembodied interests-ownership 
of an office, the right to appoint a parson to a particular church, right 
to labor [or] services in homes or in the fields, rights to be paid annu-
ities, to collect tolls from passersby, or to occupy a front seat at the 
king's coronation."27 
Finally, it has been suggested that contract rights under the 
ancient writs were personal in nature and could not be transferred. 
The assignment of a contract right is a species of a chose in action; a 
chose in action being all personal rights which cannot be claimed or 
enforced by the taking of physical possession: in other words, an 
intangible.28 Historically, choses in action were those personal 
claims based on obligations which arose from the writs of debt, deti-
nue, or trespass.29 These writs were construed narrowly, and the 
25. Holdsworth, supra note 22, at 1007. See also Garrard Glenn, The Assign-
ment of Choses in Action: Rights of a Bona Fide Purchaser, 20 VA. L. REV. 621 
(1934). 
26. See F.W. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAW. Q. REV. 481 (1886). 
27. J. DAWSON, ET AL, CASES AND COMMNETS ON CONTRACTS 902 (5th ed. 
1987). See also, Percy Bordwell, The Alienability of Non-Possessory Interests, 19 
N.C. L. REY. 279 (1941). 
28. Holdsworth, supra note 22. See also Torkington v. Magee, 2 KB. 427, 
430 (1902). 
29. See Holdsworth, supra note 22, at 1001; 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 219-20 (5th ed. 1972). The oldest writ, covenant, appeared to prom-
ise a form of action applicable to contracts. However, the requirement of a seal 
and a remedy of only specific performance proved to be unpopular. FIFOOT'S LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 13-14 (9th ed. 1976). AB early as the twelfth century, the common 
law courts recognized the writ of debt. The writ of debt could be used to recover 
the value of a breached obligation. W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN 
EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 26-28 (1914). For example, the writ could be used by a 
lender to recover money lent or by a seller to recover the purchase price of goods 
sold. The writ of debt, however, was restricted to recovering specific goods or their 
value. KESSLER, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (3d ed. 1990). Thus, 
out of commercial necessity the writ of detinue soon developed so that a fixed sum 
could be recovered. Id. AB with most of the early common law writs, detinue was 
based on the concept of the transfer of property. Accordingly, detinue allowed for 
recovery of property losses and debt allowed for recovery of contractual obligations. 
W.T. BARBOUR, supra, at 26-28. 
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rights which could be claimed under them were deemed personal 
rights, and, as such, belonged solely to the person who created them. 
Whether the action arose from what would now be classified as a 
contractual obligation or a tort was of no concern; at common law, 
the right of action was a personal matter between two persons which 
could not be sold or assigned. 30 
Whatever the reason for it, the general prohibition against as-
signment persisted generally until the 1800's. However, the common 
Debt and detinue covered a very considerable area of contract law in-
cluding the sale of goods, bailments, and loans of money. Covenant. was appropri-
ate for the residue of the promises. However, because of a reluctance to change 
the rigid requirements of these writs, contractual rights which were not based on 
the specific transfer of property were not enforceable. 
By the end of the fourteenth century, the writ of trespass on the case 
developed. A. W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE 
RISE OF THE ACTION OF AsSUMPSIT 199, 273-74 (1975) [hereinafter SIMPSON, COM-
MON LAW OF CONTRACT]. This writ allowed the transfer not only of actual property 
rights but also abstract contractual obligations. A W.B. SIMPSON, EMERGENCE OF 
CONTRACT LAW 200 (1975) [hereinafter SIMPSON, EMERGENCE OF CONTRACT LAW]. 
The characteristic feature of this action was that a plaintiff was allowed to claim 
damages by way of compensation for a wrong which had caused him harm, and 
the liability could be based upon a prior informal transaction which the other 
party had entered into with the plaintiff. In this respect, trespass on the case 
actions embodied a legal technique which was qajte different from the technique of 
the ancient contractual action of debt, detinue, and covenant, where the claimant 
could only demand recovery of tangible property. SIMPSON, COMMON LAW OF CON-
TRACT, supra, at 199-205. 
From the writ of trespass on the case, a species of case known as assUmp-
sit developed. The assumpsit, or undertaking, played an important role in actions 
on the case. Soon assumpsit encroached on the domain of all the writs. This radi-
cal change in legal doctrine was accomplished with remarkable rapidity. SIMPSON, 
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT, supra, at 249. By the seventeenth century, assumpsit 
had acquired its own identity and became a regular common law contractual doc-
trine. Assumpsit became an action for the breach of informal agreements or cove-
nants and it became almost the sole remedy for contracts by parol that did not 
involve a bailment. SIMPSON, COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT, supra, at 299. The mod-
ern English law of contract has grown up around an action of assumpsit. 
Thus, the law of contract in general had moved from a rigid emphasis on 
actual property rights to a recognition of abstract contractual obligations. See gen-
erally, MORTON J. HQRWITl, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 
160-210 (1977). This evolution of the law of contract had developed along similar 
lines of the law of negotiable instruments. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 
20, at 184-233. 
30. 2 SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 850 (1846); J.B. AMES, THE INALIEN-
ABILITY OF CHOSES IN ACTION, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 210 (1913). However, 
a party entitled to such a right could release it to the person against whom it 
could be brought, and it could have as easily been dissolved as it was created. 
Holdsworth, supra note 22, at 1003 n.23. 
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law began to succumb to the pressure to permit free assignability of 
certain limited legal rights much earlier. For example, as early as the 
fourteenth century, merchants began to circumvent the common law 
prohibition on the assignment of rights by clever application of the 
technicalities of the common law writs.31 Typically, a merchant 
would assign a right to receive a sum of money to an assignee who he 
would appoint as his attorney to sue for the debt. The appointment of 
the creditor contained a stipulation that the attorney should keep the 
amount received on the suit.32 
Also, by the fifteenth century certain claims, which were in real-
ity choses in . action involving personal rights, were categorized as 
actions to recover property, and therefore as real (as opposed to per-
sonal or intangibles) actions. Unlike actions for personal rights, as-
signments of real actions were recognized.33 Accordingly, a husband 
could release hls wife's right to previously bailed property to the 
bailee, and this contract of sale was viewed as giving a right to re-
ceive possession instead of the more obvious and accurate description 
of the right to transfer ownership of goods already possessed.34 Cate-
gorized as a property right, it was freely assignable.35 
During the seventeenth century, assignees began to bring their 
claims in the courts of chancery. The chancery courts, which appar-
ently did not have the same antipathy to assignment as did the com-
mon law courts, recognized the assignee as the owner of the claim, 
and not merely as the assignor's agent.36 The common law courts 
were not insensitive to the encroachment on their domain, and the 
acceptance of assignments in the common law courts soon followed.37 
Nonetheless, the most powerful legal tool to avoid the prohibi-
31. The writ system was burdened by formalities. In so far as it was pos-
sible to bring contractual actions, the possibility depended upon the existence of a 
suitable form of action. Thus medieval lawyers were required to manipulate the 
chose in action to accommodate the formulary writ system. SIMPSON, COMMON LAW 
OF CONTRACT, supra note 29, at 4. 
32. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 226. 
33. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 1004. In 1431, Justice 
Paston stated that "if I bailed to you a deed to rebail to me, and then I grant the 
same deed to B, I shall not have writ of detinue against you after this grant, but 
the said B will have the writ of detinue." Y.B. 9 Hy. VI Hil. pl.17 (1431). Further-
more, in 1491, the validity of a gift by a bailor seems to be maintained by 
Vavisor. Y.B. 9 Hy. VII Mich. pl.4 (pp. 8-9) (1491). 
34. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 24, at 282-84. 
35. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 24, at 282-84. 
36. Peters v. Soame, 23 Eng. Rep. 874 (Ch. 1701); Fashon v. Atwood, 22 
Eng. Rep. 819 (Ch. 1679). 
37. Winch v. Keely, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (KB. 1787). 
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tion on the assignment of debts was the development of negotiable in-
struments. The rise of the importance of negotiable instruments was 
a rapid and necessary one. The industrial revolution dramatically 
increased the number of commercial transactions which created a 
need for a means of paying for huge numbers of goods in an economy 
where metallic money was chronically in short supply. In response to 
this, bankers and mercJ;iants used bills of exchange and other nego-
tiable instruments. 38 
38. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 441, 447. A bill of exchange is an uncondition· 
al order in writing, issued by one person (the drawer) to a second person (the 
drawee), directing the first person to pay a sum certain at a specified time to a 
third person (the holder). THOMAS C. SIMONTON, THE LAW OF CHECKS, NOTES, AND 
BANKS 121 (2d ed. 1906). One of the first true negotiable instruments, the bill of 
exchange was first used by the bankers and merchants of Florence and Venice to 
facilitate the transfer of credit between distant points. In the fourteenth century, 
bills of exchange came to England by way of France and the Civil law. JAMES M. 
OGDEN, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20 (4th ed. 1938). Originally, bills 
of exchange were used to avoid sending money out of or into the country. The 
merchant paid a third party by giving an order on one of his foreign debtors. In 
addition to facilitating international transactions, though, bills of exchange also 
provided an effective method for eluding the common law rule that a debt is not 
assignable. Bills of exchange provided the assignee with an assignment binding on 
the original creditor, capable of being ratified by the debtor, and assignable still 
further. Moreover, the validity of a debt was proven by its authentication in a bill. 
of exchange. A bill of exchange reduced the debt to a sum certain, affording an 
indisputable title to the whole debt. JOHN B. BYLES, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF 
BILLS OF ExCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, BANK-NOTES, BANKERS' CASH-NOTES AND 
CHECKS x-xi (4th ed. 1856). 
Although in 1603, the first negotiable instruments case was heard in the 
common law courts involving the enforceability of a bill of exchange, Martin v. 
Boure, 79 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1603), it was another 150 years before the courts 
fully recognized that negotiable instruments should be exempt from defenses in the 
underlying transaction. In Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), the King's 
Court recognized that when a bank note came into the possession of a holder, for 
full and valuable consideration and in the normal course of business, without 
knowledge that is was stolen, the bank note should be treated as money and not 
as goods, giving bank notes the credit and currency of money. Id. at 452. Later, in 
Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 K.B. 633 (1781), it was held that like a bill of exchange, a 
stolen promissory note that passes into the possession of a good faith holder is not 
subject to the underlying transaction. Id. 
Within the last century, the law of negotiable instruments reached maturi-
ty. England codified the law of negotiable instruments in 1882 with the English 
Bills of Exchange Act. In the United States, the earliest codification of negotiable 
instruments was in the California Civil Code of 1872. JAMES MATLOCK OGDEN, 
THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 23 (4th ed. 1938). In 1896, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on.Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Negotia-
ble Instruments Law, broadly based on the English Bills of Exchange Act. These 
statutes contained the fundamental principles and essential definitions of the law 
of negotiable instruments and provided a set of standards for formal requisites of 
756 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
Because of the widespread use and utility of negotiable instru-
ments, the necessity of using basic contract assignment principles to 
achieve the same commercial results, as we suggest in this article, 
has not been closely examined. Yet, it is clear that whatever the 
formalistic reasons were which justified a prohibition against the 
assignment of contract rights, the law has developed in directions 
fully contrary to those reasons. Therefore, if the commercial goals 
sought, such as the protections afforded parties through the negotia-
ble instruments law, can be achieved through the established doc-
trines of contract assignment, such an approach should be considered 
as a viable legal alternative to achieving those goals. Furthermore, 
and more important, if the same protections afforded a party under 
the law of negotiable instruments can be achieved through the law of 
contract, the formal requirement of a paper driven transaction, as is 
now required in the negotiable instruments law, may be dispensed 
with. In this way, the present law can accommodate electronic trans-
fers without any diminution of protection to the parties. 
Moreover, modern contract law has developed into the perfect 
vehicle for the transfer of the right to the payment of money (as op-
posed to the actual payment of money). Such a statement is so empir-
ically obvious in the day to day world of contract law, that it hardly 
would appear worth saying. But since the law of negotiable instru-
ments is nothing more than the legal recognition of the right to the 
payment of money, there exists a vast overlap in the two legal are-
nas. This should not be surprising because at the same time the 
mercantile law of negotiable instruments was developing to provide a 
commercial medium for the transfer of the right to payment of mon-
ey, the law of contract in general was moving from a rigid emphasis 
on physical, tangible property rights to a recognition of abstract con-
tractual obligations.39 
negotiability, methods of transfer, rights of the holder, and liabilities of the par-
ties. Id. at 23. · 
At the time of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law's enactment, over 
ninety per cent of the greatly expanding interstate commerce was handled by com-
mercial paper, which created a need for uniformity in commercial paper law. By 
eliminating conflicting negotiable instrument laws, the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law facilitated interstate commerce, making business transactions less com-
plicated. Id. at 24, 28. Today, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code replaces 
the NIL. By any standard, for the last century, the negotiable instruments law has 
achieved the goal of facilitating and encouraging commerce. The law of negotiable 
instruments is well understood and accepted. 
39. Morton J. Horwitz, Historical Foundations of Modem Contract Law, 87 
HARV. L. REv. 917 (1974); AW.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis & the History of 
Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979). 
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This can be seen in a comparison of modern legal conceptions of 
property with an eighteenth century view of property. For example, 
Blackstone's conception of property has two aspects or dimensions: 
property can exist only in tangible things, and all propehy is abso-
lute. Clearly, neither aspect is credible today. The idea that property 
is limited to a collection of physical objects lost whatever force it had 
as courts looked for ways to extend the protective umbrella of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to protect 
new forms of wealth. The best strategy they found was to designate 
the interest involved as property.40 Thus, we see our legal concep-
tion of property is such today that the same rights and protections 
historically given to tangible property is generally accorded to intan-
gible property. In this respect, to the degree that negotiable instru-
ments allowed the transfer of intangible rights in a way that simple 
contract law did not, this aspect of negotiable instruments law can 
easily be achieved through the law of contract assignments. 
III. A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE 
INSTRUMENTS AND THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENTS 
Can the law of the assignment of contracts operate as a fully 
functional replacement to a negotiable instrument? We think so. In 
this section, we briefly examine these two bodies of law and discuss 
their basic similarities and differences. 
The principle attributes of a negotiable instrument are: the pa-
per must be freely assignable, the debt is "merged" into the paper 
evidencing the claim, transfer can only be made by physical delivery 
of the paper with evidence of the transferor's intent to make the 
transfer, discharge of the debt can only be made by payment to the 
person holding the instrument, creditors can only assert their claims 
by getting legal possession of the paper, and the situs of the debt is 
the physical location of the instrument.41 The primary legal advan-
tage bestowed by the law of negotiable instruments is the protection 
afforded the "holder in due course" from defenses which could be 
raised in the underlying transaction.42 It is this protection, which we 
40. See Dean G. Acheson, Book Review, 33 HARV. L. REV. 329, 330 (1919) 
("Everything was thought of in terms of property, - reputation, privacy, domestic 
relations, and as new interests called for protection, their success depended upon 
their ability to take on the protective coloring of property.") (footnote omitted); see 
also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325 (1980) (dis-
cussing the extension of property protection to business goodwill, trademarks, trade 
secrets, and oil and gas). 
41. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1064. 
42. For a holder of a negotiable instrument to be a holder in due course, the 
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refer to as "essential negotiability," that is not automatically given 
the assignee of a contract right, which is the primary and substantial 
distinction between negotiable instruments law and the law of con-
tract assignments. The holder in due course retains a favored legal 
position as a bona fide purchaser for value who can take and enforce 
negotiable instruments free of most claims and defenses.43 Thus, the 
legal status of holder in due course promotes transactions and en-
courages the rapid and unimpeded flow of capital. 
In contrast, an assigned contract right places the assignee in the 
same legal position as that of the assignor. Unlike the holder in due 
course, the obligor can assert any claims or defenses against the 
assignee which could have been asserted against the assignor regard-
less of whether the assignee knew of their existence at the tiµie of 
the assignment or whether the claim existed at the time of the as-
signment. 
There are other distinctions between a negotiable instrument 
and a contract assignment, but the distinctions are not substantive. 
The most obvious distinction between a negotiable instrument and a 
contract assignment are the formalities of creating the legal right. 
The formalities of a negotiable instrument are rigid and axiomatic."' 
In contrast, assignments lack these formalities. In the absence of a 
statute or contract term to the contrary, there are no prescribed 
methods to make an effective assignment. The assignor must only 
manifest his intention, either through words, conduct, or both, to 
make a present transfer of his rights to the assignee. 45 
holder must take the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of 
any defenses to the instrument itself. U.C.C. § 3-302. 
However, even a holder in due course is subject to a very limited set of 
defenses: 
[A] defense of the obligor based on (i) infancy of the obligor to the extent 
that it is a defense to a simple contract, (ii) duress, lack of legal capacity, 
or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the ob-
ligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that induced the obligor to sign the in-
strument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of 
its character or its essential terms, or (iv) discharge of the obligor in 
insolvency proceedings; 
U.C.C. § 3-305(aX1). 
43. Thus, for example, in the classic holder in due course situation, if the 
purchaser of goods pays for the goods with a negotiable instrument, regardless of 
whether the product proves defective, the product is never received, or the 
product's sale is achieved fraudulently, a holder in due course of the negotiable 
instrument is entitled to full payment on the instrument. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 5-12. 
45. · This is not to say that no legal formalities are required to make an 
effective assignment. There must be an intent to transfer a present, not future, 
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This distinction, however, is merely one of form. The require-
ments of negotiable instruments go to the question of definiteness of 
value, time of payment and the expression of who the parties are to 
the agreement. There is no reason why a contract assignment could 
not have the same level of specificity, and, at the same time, not 
require the sine quo non of a negotiable instrument: a tangible writ-
ten document. Therefore there is no substantive distinction between a 
negotiable instrument and a contract assignment that would have 
the' effect of negating the use of the law of contract assignments as a 
substitute to negotiable instruments.46 
In addition, certainly at one time, transferability served as an 
essential characteristic of negotiable instruments, and because simple 
contract rights were not assignable, this was a distinguishing ele-
ment between the two. Since the prohibition of the transfer of con-
tract rights has been abolished, this aspect of negotiable instruments 
has no particular contemporary significance. There is another major 
distinction between a holder in due course and the assignee of a 
contract right. The holder of a negotiable instrument automatically 
receives the benefit of the contracts of endorsers to pay on the instru-
ment upon dishonor47 as well as the prior transferor's implied war-
ranties.48 A contractual assignee does not normally have these bene-
fits.49 
interest. An assignment must be a completed transaction between the parties 
which is intended to vest in the assignee a present right. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 321 (1979). 
46. In saying this, we do not wish to suggest that the lack of formalities in 
assignments is not without consequences. As Professor Corbin explains, "It is not 
always easy to determine whether the owner of a right has made an assignment, 
or a mere promise to assign later on, or a promise to pay out of a fund to be 
collected." 4 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 879, at 531 (1951). Fur-
thermore, as Professor Gilmore reminds us, "Assignment law harshly requires a 
contract obligor to determine, at his own risk, the validity of assignments of 
claims against him." Grant Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and his Pre-
carious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217, 227 (1964). However, for purposes of the argu-
ment we are making here, we do not deem this a problem, as it is assumed that 
any contract and assignment of the rights of that contract that may be made pur-
suant to the ideas expressed in this article will be made with sufficient formalities 
to show the express intent of the parties. 
47. u.c.c. § 3-414(1). 
48. Id. § 3-417(2). 
49. See e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. E.T. Clancy Export Co., 612 F. Supp. 712, 
715-16 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Depending on the circumstances of the assignment, an 
assignor may implicitly make warranties which are comparable to those in U.C.C. 
§ 3-417(2) for assignments "without recourse." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 45, at § 333. These warranties do not run to subsequent as-
signees. Id. § 333(4). In addition, these warranties can be disclaimed. Id. § 333 
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In addition, the simplified procedures of enforcement also distin-
guish the holder of a negotiable instrument from the assignee of a 
contract. To enforce a negotiable instrument, a holder establishes a 
prima facie case simply by producing the instrument. 50 An assignee 
has to bring the more complicated traditional contract suit. 
Moreover, a holder of a negotiable instrument receives specific 
benefits simply by having possession of the instrument. Only the 
person in possession of the instrument can discharge the underlying 
debt. 51 This benefit is not equally accorded an assignee. Before the 
notice of the assignment, payment to the assignor discharges the 
obligor's duties.52 In addition, claimants may assert claims by seek-
ing garnishment against the obligor.53 And then there is the reoccur-
ring and never resolved question of whether the assignor and obligor 
can rearrange the debt after the assignment. 54 
In sum, the advantages accorded a party under a negotiable 
instrument which are not generally given to an assignee of a contract 
right are, freedom from defenses in the underlying transaction, sim-
plicity of proof of the right of payment, and certainty of the right of 
payment on mere possession of the instrument. As we will discuss in 
the next section, the advantages of essential negotiability can be 
created for an assignee in a carefully drafted agreement between the 
obligor and the assignor. 
IV. NEGOTIABILITY BY CONTRACT 
Thus far we have discussed the attributes of negotiability as if 
their presence could only be found in a single legal universe-that is, 
as if there were no parallel universe where one or more of these at-
tributes could exist without the presence of an indispensable writing. 
In fact, however, a coherent legal framework for negotiability without 
paper is not only possible, it already exists. The 1977 amendments to 
Article 8 of the Code were designed to accommodate for the first time 
the uncertificated security.55 In so doing, the drafters had to choose 
cmt. b. 
50. U.C.C. § 3-307(2). Furthermore, there is a presumption that all of the 
signatures are valid. Id. § 3-307(1). 
51. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 449-50. 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 338(1). 
53. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1067. 
54. Gilmore, supra note 46, at 243-249. 
55. The 1977 amendments are now incorporated in the 1990 Official Text of 
the U.C.C. See generally Martin J. Aronstein, et al., Article 8 is Ready, 93 HARV. 
L. REv. 889, 890-93 (1980) (discussing the history of the 1977 amendments). Inter-
estingly, this new system of securities ownership envisioned by the drafters has 
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between a system of non-negotiability based on the law's traditional 
treatment of commercial intangibles, and a system of negotiability 
based on the certificated security. In an effort to "facilitate the elimi-
nation or reduction in use of negotiable stock certificates,"56 the 
drafters chose the latter system.57 For the first time the world be-
held the "negotiable non-instrument. "58 
What bearing does the legal structure of Article 8 have on the 
negotiability of intangibles generally? Two conclusions follow from 
the development of the certificateless system. First, and most impor-
tantly, the legal system should be allowed to depart from current 
commercial law and practice, certainly in the face of changed condi-
tions, but also to reflect new views of policy. Second, new departures 
should be accorded somewhat more deference than longstanding 
practices if the departure is for reasons that have to do with techno-
logical change and new conceptions of property. But this is not to say 
that courts are free do whatever they wish. Because much of commer-
cial law has been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, it is 
clear that within a wide range the choice of policy is for the legisla-
ture. 
For example, on the question of negotiability, the Code makes it 
clear that the scope of Article 3 is defined by the definition of "nego-
tiable instrument"59 and, despite the general ability of parties to 
yet to materialize. With the exception of mutual fund shares, "virtually all other 
forms of publicly traded corporate securities are still issued in certificated form." 
U.C.C. REvlSED ARTICLE 8, Prefatory Note, at 2 (1994). Article 8 has again been 
revised, this time to accommodate the evolution of the indirect holding system. See 
id. . 
56. Aronstein, et al, supra note 55, at 890. 
57. The decision to opt for a system of negotiability was based on the belief 
that such a security would be more acceptable to the commercial community and 
on the premise that cost and efficiency should be determinative of which type of 
security to issue, not which form produces the better result for one of the parties 
to a particular transaction. Aronstein, et al., supra note 55, at 893-94. But see 
Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under revised Article 8 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1979) (criticizing the 
1977 amendments). 
58. Aronstein, et al., supra note 55, at 896. 
59. Section 3-104 acts as the basic section defining the reach of Article 3. It, 
however, cannot be read in isolation. 
An instrument is either a "promise," defined in Section 3-103(a)(9), or "or-
der," defined in Section 3-103(a)(6). A promise is a written undertaking to 
pay money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An order is a writ-
ten instruction to pay money signed by the person giving instruction. 
Thus, the term "negotiable instrument" is limited to a signed writing that 
orders or promises payment of money. 
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 1. 
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vary by agreement the Code's provisions,60 this is one instance 
where freedom of contract is restrained.61 Whether or not a narrow 
formulation of this restriction on the parties' contractual freedom is 
desirable, it is still possible to find a place for an alternative system 
of negotiability by exploring the relationship between that principle 
and other Code provisions. Indeed, comment 2 to section 3-104 not 
only suggests the application of Article 3 by analogy,62 it raises the 
possibility that the parties can, by appropriate contract, achieve some 
or all of the attributes of negotiability.63 
In this Part, we discuss how the doctrine of good faith purchase 
interacts with other principles and Code sections. We conclude that 
the current restrictions on negotiability are overcome by methods 
that permit the original parties to a transaction to create for them-
60. See id. § 1-102(3) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by 
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act .... "). 
61. Comment 2 to section 1-102 so provides by stating that "private parties 
cannot make an instrument negotiable within the meaning of Article 3 except as 
provided in Section 3-104 .... " Id. § 1-102 cmt. 2. See .also id. §§ 3-102(a) ("This 
Article applies to negotiable instruments."), 3-104 cmt. 2 ("a writing cannot be 
made a negotiable instrument within Article 3 by contract or conduct of the par-
ties .... "). 
62. There are cases where the former Article 3 has been applied by analogy. 
See, e.g., United States v. First National Bank, 263 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1967); 
Sweeney v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 S.E.2d 858 (Va. 1983). In contrast, see European 
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Starcrete International Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 
564 (5th Cir. 1980). 
63. Comment 2 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Moreover, consistent with the principle stated in Section 1-102(2)(b), the 
immediate parties to an order or promise that is not an instrument may 
provide by agreement that one or more of the provisions of Article 3 de-
termine their rights and obligations under the writing. Upholding the 
parties choice is not inconsistent with Article 3. Such an agreement may 
bind a transferee of the writing if the transferee has notice of it or the 
agreement arises from usage of trade and the agreement does not violate 
other law or public policy. An example of such an agreement is a provi-
sion that a transferee of the writing has the rights of a holder in due 
course stated in Article 3 if the transferee took rights under the writing 
in good faith, for value, and without notice of a claim or defense. 
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2. It would seem that this expression of the drafters' intent 
would preclude a rebirth of the negotiability by contract controversy that existed 
under the Negotiable Instruments Law. See generally, Frederick K Beutel, Negotia-
bility by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1934). Not all would agree, however, with 
the drafters' choice. See William E. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The 
Negotiable Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 
ROCKY MNT. L. REV. 1, 32 (1953) (stating that the invitation to "courts to confer 
upon various nonconforming writings, some of the attributes of negotiability, is 
thoroughly unsound ... [and] should be struck from the Code."). 
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selves a universe of essential negotiability. That universe would en-
able a good faith purchaser of an intangible for the payment of mon-
ey to cut off defenses of the obligor, ascertain the existence of prior 
claims and assure against subordination to future claims.64 
A. Cutting Off Defenses of Obligors 
By most accounts the so-called cut-off clause, by which the buyer 
waived, against all assignees, any defenses which she might have 
against the seller, was the central concept through which sales fi-
nance companies were able to develop into national enterprises. 65 
Their ultimate financial success depended in great measure upon 
their being able to achieve free-of-defenses status on both the money 
claim and on the security agreement. The idea of inserting a waiver 
of defenses provision into the conditional sale contract appealed to 
the legal imagination, for, if it proved successful, it would at once 
free finance companies from buyers' defenses even in those jurisdic-
tions where title retention clauses rendered the sales notes nonnego-
tiable66 and despite the refusal of courts to apply the "imparting ne-
gotiability" doctrine to conditional sales.67 
Initially, the courts' response to cut-off clauses was less than 
favorable. It was inevitable that this attempt to waive defenses 
would ultimately draw into question the ability of parties to make 
instruments negotiable by contract. Indeed, the idea that these 
clauses were an attempt to circumvent the mandatory nature of the 
64. To be sure, it may be possible to achieve by contract a number of other 
attributes of negotiability; some of which may depend upon the existence of a 
writing. For example, the rules as to alteration and incomplete instruments would 
seem to make sense only if the contract is embodied in a written document. See 
U.C.C. § 3-407. For present purposes it will be sufficient if we limit our discussion 
to only those attributes that we have identified as essential to a universe of nego-
tiability. 
65. See Gilmore, supra note l, at 1093-98. 
66. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 218 P.2d 181 (Kan. 
1950) (holding that conditional sales contract destroyed negotiability of note); Cen-
tral Nat. Bank v. Hubbel, 154 N.E. 551 (Mass. 1927); Polk County State Bank of 
Cookston v. Walters, 176 N.W. 496 (Min. 1920). But see Chicago Ry. Equipment 
Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 136 U.S. 268 (1890) (holding that a conditional sales con-
tract does not destroy negotiability of note); Howard v. Simpki~, 69 Ga. 773 
(1882); Burnley v. Tufts, 5 So. 627 (Miss. 1888). 
67. The "imparting negotiability" doctrine provided that if a negotiable note 
and mortgage are given by the debtor, the negotiability of the note will be "im-
parted" to the mortgage, so that both can be transferred free of outstanding equi-
ties and defenses. See 127 A.L.R. 190 (1940). For some unknown reason the doc-
trine was never applied to conditional sale contracts. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 
1094. 
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Negotiable Instruments Law by creating a new type of negotiable 
instrument won judicial endorsement in several jurisdictions.68 De-
spite this early resistance, between 1930 and 1940 the tide turned 
and a majority of courts ultimately honored the effectiveness of waiv-
er of defenses clauses embodied in nonnegotiable instruments.69 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the no negotiability by contract 
assault on cut-off clauses, courts sometimes said that the defense of 
fraud could not be waived. 70 By contrast, a contractual waiver was 
effective to bar a simple breach of warranty defense. It seems clear 
that although the finance companies would have preferred a fully 
negotiable instrument, the protection they received from the cut-off 
clause was probably all the protection they needed in the vast majori-
ty of cases. 
All of this being said, perhaps the most persuasive evidence of 
the capacity of parties to waive defenses by contract today is the 
most obvious one: U.C.C. section 9-206. Under this section, one is 
entitled to the status of a holder in due course if the following condi-
tions are met: 
[A]n agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert 
against any assignee any claim or defense which he may have 
against the seller is enforceable by an assignee who takes his 
assignment for value, in good faith, and without notice of ~ 
claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be 
asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instru~ 
ment under the article on commercial paper (Article 3 of this 
title).71 
68. See, e.g., American Nat1 Bank v. Sommerville, Inc., 216 P. 376 (Cal. 
1923); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 298 P. 705 (Wash. 1931); Progres-
sive Finance & Realty Co. v. Stempel, 95 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933). 
69. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1096-97. 
70. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1096. 
71. U.C.C. § 9-206. In the context of consumer transactions, there has long 
been recognition of the need for greater protection against unscrupulous sellers. 
For this reason many state legislatures have enacted statutes which prohibit waiv-
ers by consumers. See Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Trans-
actions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L.Q. 503 (1975); Alan 
Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer 
Sales, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REY. 499 (1974). In 1975, the Federal Trade Com-
mission entered the fray with a rule that made it an unfair trade practice to at-
tempt to deprive consumers of their defenses. See 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1994). See also 
Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in 
Due. Course Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How Clever are the Rascals at the 
FTC, 68 N.C. L. REV. 953. 
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To be sure, the waiver of defense clause does not create a negotiable 
instrument. But if it is used, it will make it possible to achieve one of 
the most basic attributes of negotiability.72 If the assignee would 
otherwise qualify as a holder in due course, 73 she will take free of 
"personal" defenses, but not "real" defenses.74 
This approach has a good deal to be said in its favor. Above all, 
it is a plausible way for an assignee to take free of defenses in situa-
tions where there is no writing that embodies the underlying obliga-
tion. Although it is common parlance to speak of a waiver of defense 
or cut off clause, there is no requirement that it be in writing.75 And 
if it need not be evidenced by a writing, the "agreement" can be man-
ifested orally or can come from other relevant circumstances in-
cluding trade usage, course of dealing and, as the Code now reads, 
maybe course of performance. 76 
There are, however, at least two problems with this approach. 
First, the need for certainty in this area may call for an easy way to 
ascertain whether the debtor did, in fact, waive defenses. Absent a 
written waiver, how can this be accomplished? The resolution of this 
problem might well call for an understanding of modern communica-
tion and storage technologies. These include "magnetic media, optical 
discs, digital voice messaging systems, electronic mail, audio tapes 
and photographic media, as well as paper."77 Thus, whether or not 
72. In the absence of such an agreement "the rights of an assignee are sub-
ject to all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and 
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and any other defense or claim of the ac-
count debtor against the assignor which arose before the account debtor receives 
notification of the assignment." U.C.C. § 9-318(1). 
73. Query whether for purposes of section 9-206 the definition of value in 
section 3-303 controls, rather than the general definition of value appearing in 
section 1-201(44). 
74. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
75. Moreover, if it is in writing it need not be conspicuous. See, e.g., Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A v. Coleman, 496 A2d 935 (R.I. 1985). 
76. Although the definition of "agreement" in section 1-201(3) includes usage 
of trade, course of dealing and course of performance, the definition of course of 
performance appears in section 2-208 and the concept is conspicuously absent from 
the interpretational priority set out in section 1-205(4). See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 2-
208, 1-205(4). It is therefore open to question whether course of performance was 
intended to be part of the definition of agreement when that term appears outside 
of Article 2. Recently, the AB.A Article 1 Task Force recommended to the Perma-
nent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. that the definition of course of performance be 
relocated to Article 1 and that section 1-205 be amended accordingly. The Perma-
nent Editorial Board has accepted this recommendation. 
77. Proposed Comment Language, submitted by Professor Patricia B. Fry to 
the Reporters for the Limited Liability Company and U.C.C. Article 5 Drafting 
Committees. 
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the debtor's agreement is in writing, there may be a "record" of the 
agreement. 78 
Another strategy for overcoming this problem might be. to have 
the waiver of defenses reflected in a trading partner agreement.79 
This agreement would structure the relationship between the debtor 
and its original creditor and would act as a source of information for 
interested third parties. Of course, the idea of a separately negotiated 
trading partner agreement only makes sense if the original parties 
intend to transact business on a somewhat regular basis. 
The second problem with the section 9-206 approach is its scope. 
In some cases the debtor will be neither a buyer or a lessee.80 The 
creditor might, for example, have a claim against the debtor for ser-
vices rendered. Although this claim would be an Article 9 account,81 
it would not seem to be within the contemplation of section 9-206. 
Although a broader scope to section 9-206 would have the virtue of 
simplicity and ease of application it would seem that essential nego-
tiability could still be achieved. Recall that the official comment to 
section 3-104 makes it explicitly clear that notwithstanding the 
78. The term "record" will appear in the Code for the first time when re-
vised Article 5 (Letters of Credit) receives final approval by the American Law In-
stitute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See 
U.C.C. § 5-102(14) (Proposed Draft 1994). That section will read as follows: "Record 
means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in au 
electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id. We antici-
pate that the same term will also appear in the other Code Articles under revision 
and ultimately as one of the general definitions in section 1-201. All of this makes 
it clear that a writing is but one of many possible forms of record. 
79. See generally Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchanqe Agreements: 
Private Contracting Toward a Gl-Obal Environment, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 31 
(1992). Boss writes: 
The terms trading partner agreement and interchange agreement are gener-
ally used interchangeably, the former being the preferred American usage 
and the latter the international formulation. Arguably, however, the terms 
may reflect a difference in approach: the trading partner agreement refer-
ring to any agreement structuring the relationship between the trading 
partners, whether arising from the exchange of electronic information or 
not, and the interchange agreement being restricted to the exchange of in-
formation electronically. 
Id. at 37-38 n.27. 
80. Originally, section 9-206 only referred to buyers. Lessees were included 
in 1962 because of the "substantial growth in lease financing and the quite paral-
lel application of problems dealt with by this section to both conditional sale con-
tracts and leases." 4 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-206, at 197-99 
(2d ed. 1971). In the case of a finance lease under Article 2A, a "hell or high 
water clause," is made a part of every agreement. See U.C.C. § 2A-407(1). 
81. See id. § 9-106. 
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parties' ability to contract into Article 3 they are nevertheless free to 
contract for the various attributes of negotiability.82 To accord such 
power to the parties would suggest that with the passage of new 
Article 3, section 9-206 has become redundant.83 But the statement 
about negotiability has been relegated to a comment, and there is as 
yet no clear answer to this question. 
Because the ability to recover the full amount of the underlying 
claim is what is crucial here, the assignee's position is enhanced 
considerably by the warranties that it receives from its assignor. An 
assignor impliedly warrants that the assigned right is subject to no 
defenses or claims good against the assignor.84 Moreover, the assign-
ee may require warranties in addition to those implied by law.85 For 
example the assignee can demand an express warranty that the obli-
gor is solvent and that she will perform her obligation.86 
In sum, an assignee of a claim can minimize the risk of nonpay-
ment by capitalizing on the warranties-express and implied-given 
by the assignor. Even if the obligor can successfully resist payment, 
the assignor stands as an alternative source of recovery. An approach 
of this sort appears to be a reasonable substitute for negotiability. 
B. Competing Claims of Ownership 
The competing claims problem has two dimensions: one who 
acquires an obligation by assignment (a) has to be protected against 
claims of ownership predicated on events which occurred prior to the 
82. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
83. Comment 1 to section 9-206 explains that the section was intended to 
settle the negotiability by contract debate. It states: "These clauses have led to lit-
igation and their present status under the case law is in confusion. In. some juris-
dictions they have been held void as attempts to create negotiable instruments ' 
outside the framework of Article 3 or on the grounds of public policy. In others 
they have been allowed to operate .... " U.C.C. § 9-206 cmt. 1. 
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 333(1). 
Compare this warranty with that given by the transferor of an negotiable instru-
ment without an indorsement. Such a person warrants, among other things, that 
"the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim in recoupment of any party 
which can be asserted against the warrantor .... " U.C.C. § 3-416(aX4). 
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 333 cmt. 
b. ("The rules stated in this Section can be varied by agreement. Express warran-
ties are created in the same ways as express warranties in the transfer of 
goods .... "). 
86. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-415(a) ("[I]f an instrument is dishonored, an indorser is 
obliged to pay the amount due on the instrument . . . according to the terms of 
the instrument at the time it was indorsed .... "). The words "with recourse" ordi-
narily constitute such a guarantee of payment. See e.g., Ranchers Bank v. Press-
man, 97 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1971). 
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assignment, and (b) has to be protected against claims of ownership 
predicated on events which occur subsequent to the assignment. It is 
commonly believed that the transformation of an intangible claim 
into a negotiable instrument is the principle means of coping with 
both aspects of the problem. As we explain, however, modern con-
cepts of property and contract together with the existence of . the 
Article 9 filing system protect the expectations of current assignees 
at least as well as the negotiability system, permitting them to ac-
quire and retain most rights to payment free from the interference of 
others. 
1. Existing Claims of Ownership 
According to the traditional conception of the good faith pur-
chase doctrine, only the transfer of a negotiable instrument ensures 
that the purchaser will take free of existing claims of ownership.87 
Yet, despite its wideniable advantages, the negotiability system is 
generally unsuited to handle this problem. No one has placed greater 
stress on this particular point than James S. Rogers. 88 
Rogers points to the rather obvious fact that the advantages of 
holder in due course status are unobtainable unless the transferee of 
the instrument first becomes a holder.89 That is, unless the instru-
ment is properly negotiated, the significant benefits that accrue to a 
holder in due course are lost.90 Problems can arise because an in-
strument in order form can only be negotiated if properly indorsed.91 
Thus, if an order instrument is stolen or if the true owner's agent 
indorses in excess of authority, no subsequent transferee can become 
a holder.92 This means that in a vast array of disputes involving 
87. See e.g., William F. Willier, Nonnegotiable Instruments, 11 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 13, 24 (1959) ("Negotiable" in its most important sense means the ability of a 
transferee to acquire greater contract and property rights than his transferor 
had."). See also supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
88. See generally James Steven Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title 
Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197 (1987). 
89. Id. at 211. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (" '[H)older in due course' means the 
holder of an instrument .... "). 
90. How an instrument is negotiated will depend on whether it is in bearer 
or order form. If in order form "negotiation requires transfer of possession of the 
instrument and its endorsement by the holder. If an instrument is payable to 
bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone." U.C.C. § 3-201(b). 
See also id. § 1-201(20) (stating the definition of the term "holder"). 
91. Id. § 1-201(20). 
92. See id. §§ 1-201(43) ("'Unauthorized' signature means one made without 
actual, implied, or apparent authority and includes a forgery."); 3-403(a) (1990) 
("Unless otherwise provided in this Article or Article 4, an unauthorized signature 
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conflicting ownership claims "the effect of the rules of transfer of 
negotiable instruments is precisely the opposite of that assumed by 
the usual assertions: the negotiability rules ensure that any subse-
quent parties, even bona fide purchasers, will take subject to the 
prior ownership claim."93 
Suppose, however, that the obligation is not embodied in a nego-
tiable instrument. The risk to the transferee is not that the obliga-
tion was previously stolen, which concededly would be impossible 
since there is nothing tangible to steal,94 but rather there still may 
be the risk that the assignment is being made by one without appro-
priate authority. But this risk is independent of the form that the 
obligation tak.es.95 Ironically, as it turns out, if the obligation has 
been transformed into a negotiable instrument courts may actually 
be less willing to find authority to transfer than they would in other 
circumstances.96 In the end, this may mean that the transferee who 
relies on the negotiability system for protection may actually find 
herself at a disadvantage. 
Consider next, by contrast, prior equitable claims of owner-
ship. 97 Certainly a holder in due course will take free of these 
claims.98 But to understand and evaluate the need for negotiability 
is ineffective. . . . "). 
93. Rogers, supra note 88, at 213. 
94. To say this is not to deny that a situation similar to theft might not 
occur. Suppose, for example, that prior to the assignment to X the assignor had 
previously assigned the same claim to Y. In such a case, could it not be said that 
the assignor is attempting to steal the interest already granted to Y? Because 
discussion of this issue will inevitably involve the Article 9 filing system we re-
serve it for later in the article. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
95. This is a matter of agency law, not negotiable instruments law or the 
law governing any other type of transfer. "Thus, the position of a transferee of a 
negotiable instrument ·in order form that was transferred by an agent in excess of 
the agent's actual authority is at best the same as that of a transferee of any 
other form of property in such circumstances." Rogers, supra note 88, at 212. 
96. Rogers notes that "the field of negotiable instruments law has provided 
what may be the most extreme instance of narrow construction of an agent's au-
thority known to American law." Rogers, supra note 88, at n.62. 
97. Rogers refers to these claims as "secret equities," and makes the point 
that this category of claims "is as broad as the inclination of the courts of equity 
to lend their assistance to parties who have lost property, by some misfortune or 
equity." Rogers, supra note 88, at 202. 
98. See U.C.C. § 3-306. Section 3-306 states: 
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a 
holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory 
right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a 
negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having 
rights of a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument. 
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in this context, attention must focus on whether the assignee would 
take subject to these claims if no negotiable instrument were in-
volved. To be sure, there was a time when the interest of a bona fide 
purchaser would be subordinate to latent equities, but that is no 
longer true. 99 One of the more explicit articulations of the current 
state of the law is found in the Restatement (Second) Contracts: 
If an assignor's right against the obligor is held in trust or 
constructive trust for or subject to a right of avoidance or 
equitable lien of another than the obligor, an assignee does 
not so hold it if he gives value and becomes an assignee in 
good faith and without notice of the right of the other.100 
Two quite general conclusions emerge from the discussion so far. 
First, even the transferee of a negotiable instrument may be vulnera-
ble to competing claims of ownership. To that extent, the form that 
the underlying obligation takes is irrelevant. Second, holder in due 
course status is not the only shield that protects transferees against 
latent equities. The bona fide purchase doctrine will provide the 
transferee with the same degree of protection. 
2. Future Claims of Ownership 
It seems clear that once a monetary obligation has been trans-
formed into a negotiable instrument the only effective way to deal 
with the underlying claim will be to deal with the instrument. In 
other words, the only way to transfer the claim is to transfer the 
instrument.1°1 This explains why, with some exceptions, the holder 
of the instrument will be the only one with any rights on it and the 
only one who can enforce payment of the obligation.102 It also means 
that to be a holder one must have possession of the instrument.103 
Id. 
99. Originally, it was thought that the assignee received merely an equitable 
interest. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36. This meant that it was subject 
to all prior equities. 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 413-415 (1st ed. 
1881) ("where there are equal equities, the first in order of time shall prevail."). 
Today, the interest is considered to be legal and, as such, is not subject to prior 
equities of the assignee. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 
105-12 and accompanying text. 
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 343. 
101. This is true whether or not the transfer is voluntary. Ha creditor wishes 
to get at the value of the underlying claim, she must first gain possession of the 
instrument. s. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' AND DEBTORS' 
PROTECTION 173 n.2 (3d ed. 1979). 
102. See U.C.C. § 3-301 ("Person Entitled to Enforce Instrument"). 
103. The holder of a negotiable instrument "means the person in possession if 
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The central point is this: rightful possession of the paper guarantees 
priority over prior and subsequent assignees of the same claim. By 
taking and keeping possession of the instrument, the holder can 
effectively ensure that no competing claimant can achieve have prior-
ity.104 
The priority of competing assignees of a nonnegotiable chose has 
always been considerably more complex. The problem here is that 
there are at least three common law approaches that a court can take 
to decide this type of case. A court can apply the "New York" 
rule, 105 the "English" rule, 106 or what is alternatively referred to 
as the "Massachusetts" or "four horsemen" rule. 107 In this legal en-
vironment an assignee faces two difficulties. First, there is no effec-
tive way for him to learn whether the same claim had been assigned 
previously. Second, even in the absence of a prior assignment, the 
assignee may find its interest subordinated to a subsequent assignee. 
Given such a regime, we may wonder whether the negotiability sys-
tem provides the only effective mechanism of title assurance. 
There is a ready answer to this question. Clearly, with the pro-
mulgation of Article 9 of the Code we now have a system of title 
assurance which will provide the assignee with the information and 
protection she needs. Although the most obvious application of Article 
9 is to consensual liens on personal property, its scope is not so limit-
the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instrument payable to an 
identified person, if the identified person is in possession." Id. § 1-201(20). 
104. As Rogers explains: "[T]he rule that interests in negotiable instruments 
can be effectuated only by possession of the instrument provides a simple mecha-
nism of title assurance." Rogers, supra note 88, at 205. 
105. The "New York" rule is a first-in-time rule. It is premised on the idea 
that after the first assignment, there would be nothing left for the assignor to 
assign. See, e.g., Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 AD. 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1925). 
106. The "English" rule too favors the first-in-time assignee. The difference 
between it and the New York rule is that under the former, the second assignee 
can achieve priority by being the first to notify the obligor of the assignment. See 
Dearle v. Hall, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828). 
107. See Rabinowitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 126 N.E. 289 (Mass. 1920). This 
is the rule that we find in the Restatement. The first assignee prevails, unless: 
[T]he subsequent assignee in good faith and without reason to know of 
the prior assignment gives value and obtains 
(i) payment or satisfaction of the obligation, 
(ii) judgment against the obligor, 
(iii) a new contract with the obligor by novation, or 
(iv) possession of a writing of a type customarily accepted as a 
symbol or as evidence of the right assigned. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 342. 
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ed. It also covers sales of accounts. 108 Thus, if the assigned right to 
payment is an account the first assignee who files a financing 
statement wins. 109 In light of this, a potential assignee can deter-
mine from the appropriate filing office exactly where it will stand 
following the assignment. If there are no financing statements on file, 
the assignee can ensure its priority by filing immediately.110 What 
we have, therefore, is a system which, if not superior to the negotia-
bility system, m will reduce t4e cost of uncertainty just as well. 112 
V. CONCLUSION 
According to a well-worn epigram we learn nothing from his-
tory except that we learn nothing from history. If, however, 
such learning were possible, future developments might take 
place with less grinding of gears. The law will continue to 
make, regardless of precedents and statutes, the necessary 
accommodation to changing practice. There must be a time lag 
in adjusting to a new way of doing business; just as it took a 
few years or more for the law to recognize that an automobile 
(although it has four wheels) is not in all respects like a horse 
(which has four legs). But admitting the time lag, the adjust-
ment can be made with relative ease and at little cost; or it 
108. Article 9 applies: 
[T]o any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a 
security interest in personal property . . . and also to any sale of chattel 
paper. 
U.C.C. § 9-102. An " '[a]ccount means any right to payment for goods sold or 
leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel 
paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance.' "Id. § 9-106. 
109. See id. § 9-312(5). There is no need to file, however, if the assignment 
"does not alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee 
transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor." Id. § 9-
302(i)(c). 
110. The assignee can even file before the assignment is made. See id. § 9-
402(1). 
111. Indeed, there are those who argue that the benefits of the Article 9 
filing system outweigh those of the negotiability system. See Clark, supra note 19, 
at 473-479; Rogers, supra note 88, at 202-209. 
112. One might object that this conclusion ignores the fact that not all mone-
tary claims are accounts. If a non-account is assigned, the priority of successive 
assignees would be determined according to whichever common law rule is followed 
by the particular jurisdiction. See supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text. 
While this is presently true, it should be noted that the Article 9 Drafting Com-
mittee has tentatively decided to include within the scope of Article 9 the outright 
sale of all rights to the payment of moneY,. 
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can be made roughly and at the cost of a great deal of litiga-
tion. The more readily we can accept as a basic proposition, 
that the corpus of the law is a floating mass and not a solid 
body, the more easily will the necessary changes be made, 
and, paradoxically, the greater will be the real, as distin-
guished from the apparent certainty.113 
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Grant Gilmore wrote those words forty years ago. Then, he wor-
ried about whether, with the adoption of the new Uniform Commer-
cial Code, the law would be able to keep pace with evolving commer-
cial practices. This symposium proves that his concern is not any less 
valid today. As commercial practice becomes more electronic, the 
challenge will be to adjust our traditional paper-based rules to keep 
pace with this new way of transacting business. 
It is beyond question that the formal requirement that a nego-
tiable instrument must be written cannot accommodate electronic 
messaging technologies. But it must be recognized that the question 
is not an all-or-nothing one between traditional negotiability and no 
negotiability. The barriers to "essential" negotiability outside of the 
traditional negotiability system have shrunk considerably since the 
system was first developed. Excessive focus on what constitutes a 
writing has, therefore, obscured the field. This Article has argued 
that it may be time to abandon our efforts to somehow make paper-
based rules fit electronic commerce, while accepting other common 
law and statutory concepts for what they can accomplish. If the, re-
sponse to electronic commerce is new legislation, we hope that our 
analysis will provide a foundation on which appropriate legislation 
can be based. 
113. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1107. 

